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The Anti-Injunction Statute-Timing Federal Court
Stays of State Court Proceedings: Roth v. Bank of
the Commonwealth
A group of investors gave promissory notes in return for in-
vestment contracts offered by the Calderone-Curran Ranches,
Inc. (Ranch),1 and the Ranch pledged these notes to the Bank
of the Commonwealth (Bank) as collateral for loans. During
the Ranch's subsequent bankruptcy proceedings, the investors
brought suit in federal district court against both the Ranch
and the Bank, and alleged that the sale of the investment con-
tracts had violated federal and state securities laws.2 When in-
formed by the Bank that it intended to file collection actions on
the promissory notes in a number of state courts, the investors
fied in federal court a motion for an ex parte temporary re-
straining order to preserve the status quo until the securities
law issues had been litigated in federal court.3 The court did
1. Between August 1970 and late 1973, the Ranch made four offerings of
investment contracts for the ownership and maintenance of cattle, with the cat-
tle serving as security on the investors' notes. Roth v. Bank of the Common-
wealth, 583 F.2d 527, 528-29 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 442
U.S. 925 (1979).
2. The investors brought suit under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1976), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1976), and rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5, promulgated under the 1934 Act. The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts to adjudicate alleged
violations of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976), and of rule lOb-5, see, e.g., Clark v.
Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975).
The investors alleged material misrepresentations in the Ranch's prospec-
tuses offering investment contracts and claimed that the Bank knew or should
have known of the misrepresentations because it acted as a control person in
issuing the securities, prepared and possessed the notes and sales agreements,
imposed credit qualifications on sales, dealt directly with the investors, knew of
the Ranch's reputation for fraud and mismanagement, and knew of the Ranch's
misleading accounting practices. This knowledge, according to the investors,
prevented the Bank from being a holder in due course of the notes under
U.C.C. § 3-302, and thereby precluded the Bank from enforcing the notes. Brief
for Appellees at 7-9, Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 442 U.S. 925 (1979).
3. On August 27, 1976, the plaintiffs filed in federal district court in Michi-
gan a motion for a preliminary injunction to restrain the Bank from instituting
any suits in state or federal courts to collect on the promissory notes. Upon the
Bank's representation that it did not then intend to initiate any such suits, the
court adjourned the motion until November 1, 1976. When the instant action
was stayed pending the outcome of a companion federal district court case in
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not grant this relief but did schedule a formal hearing on the
matter to take place about three weeks later. Prior to the for-
mal hearing, the Bank instituted approximately seventy sepa-
rate collection actions. One week after the formal hearing the
court issued a temporary restraining order, and three months
later it issued a preliminary injunction4 prohibiting any sepa-
rate state civil actions for deficiencies on the notes. The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, hold-
ing that when none of its express exceptions apply, the anti-
injunction statute5 absolutely bars a federal court from issuing
an injunction staying state court proceedings instituted before
the injunction was granted, even if the motion to enjoin was
made before the state court proceedings were instituted.6 Roth
v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.
dismissed per stipulation, 442 U.S. 925 (1979).
The potential for conflict that exists when state and federal
courts both entertain proceedings on the same controversy 7
New York, the Bank notified the federal court that it did not plan to initiate col-
lection actions until some time beyond November 1. The parties therefore
agreed to postpone indefinitely the hearing on the preliminary injunction. In
early March 1977, the Bank informed the plaintiffs that it would soon initiate
collection actions on the notes. The plaintiffs sought an ex parte temporary re-
straining order against the institution of the suits so that they might conduct
discovery vital to their previous motion for a preliminary injunction. The court
denied this application but scheduled a conference for March 14, 1977. At this
conference, the court granted the parties two weeks to brief the issues, includ-
ing the possible application of the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1976). After the conference, but before the formal hearing of March 28, the
Bank commenced approximately 70 collection suits in state and federal courts.
One week after the formal hearing, the court finally issued the temporary re-
straining order requested by the plaintiffs. 583 F.2d at 529-30.
4. The plaintiffs had originally prayed for a preliminary injunction, but
the hearing on the motion was postponed indefinitely pending the outcome of a
companion case in the federal district court for the Western District of New
York. 583 F.2d at 529; see note 3 supra. The court granted the preliminary in-
junction to protect the investors against the effect of the stay of their suit, to
prevent duplicative proceedings and inconsistent rulings in state and federal
courts, and to prevent the investors from being compelled to raise their federal
securities law claims as mere defenses in state courts not competent to grant
affirmative relief. 583 F.2d at 530-31 (quoting district court's memorandum opin-
ion of July 8, 1977).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), quoted in text accompanying note 9 infra.
6. The Court of Appeals also held that the anti-injunction statute does not
prohibit federal courts from staying federal diversity proceedings, that the dis-
trict court did not err in considering the "possibility" of litigation success as a
standard for the exercise of equity power, and that the district court did err in
not considering the need for the moving party to provide security for the en-
joined party. 583 F.2d at 536-39.
7. See, e.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs,




creates a need for rules that minimize needless inter-court fric-
tion. In an attempt to deal with an aspect of this conflict, Con-
gress in 1948 enacted the current version of the anti-injunction
statute,8 section 2283 of title 28: "A court of the United States
may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State
court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effec-
tuate its judgments."9 In addition to this statutory prohibition,
the principles of equity,O comity," and federalism12 govern the
8. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2283, 62 Stat. 968. The original anti-in-
junction statute provided: "nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay pro-
ceedings in any court of a state." Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat 335.
The congressional intent underlying the original act is not clear. See Mayton,
Ersatz Federalism Under the Anti-Injunction Statute, 78 COLuM. L. REV. 330, 335
n.35 (1978); Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HARv. L.
R.v. 726, 727 (1961). One commentator has argued that the Act of 1793 was not
directed at federal courts, but only at individual Supreme Court justices. See
Mayton, supra, at 333.
The original Act was revised in 1874 to read: 'The writ of injunction shall
not be granted by a court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court
of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law
relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." REV. STAT. § 720 (1875) (enacted during
1873-1874 congressional session). For discussion of the 1874 Act, see Mayton,
supra; Taylor & Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in
State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169 (1933); Warren, Federal and State Court Inter-
ference, 43 HARv. L. REV. 345 (1930). In 1911, the 1874 Act was codified as sec-
tion 265 of the Judicial Code. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 265, 36 Stat. 1162.
The Judicial Code was amended in 1948 to include the current version of the
anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), quoted in text accompanying
note 9 infra. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2283, 62 Stat. 968.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
10. The application of equitable principles, because discretionary, varies
with the circumstances. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 199-201 (1973); 11
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CnIL § 2942 (1973
& Supp. 1979). In determining whether to grant equitable relief, a court may
consider the likelihood, extent, and permanence of harm to all parties, the bal-
ance of hardships and the availability of adequate security, the public interest,
the probability of success on the merits, and the existence of serious and diffi-
cult questions requiring deliberation. Id.; see Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus-
Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740-43 (2d Cir. 1953); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 403 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. Mich. 1975). One court
has observed that if one of the statutory exceptions to section 2283 exists, the
case usually also meets the requirements of equity. See Tampa Phosphate MM
v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 418 F.2d 387, 396 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 910 (1970).
11. Comity is the respect that courts show for the functions and powers of
courts in different jurisdictions. The principle assumes that courts operate best
without the interference of other courts. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-
45 (1971); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 52A, at
231-32 (3d ed. 1976).
12. The concept of federalism embraces a variety of principles governing
the relationship between the federal government and state governments. Fed-
eralism is the source of various federal abstention doctrines that operate to bar
federal court stays of state proceedings by prohibiting either the federal pro-
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propriety of the exercise of federal court power to stay state
court proceedings.' 3
Prior to the 1941 decision of the Supreme Court in Toucey
v. New York Life Insurance Co.,14 courts interpreted the vari-
ous predecessors' 5 of section 2283 as if they established a flex-
ible rule of comity,' 6 and, as a result, the general rule
prohibiting federal courts from staying state court proceedings
was qualified by several exceptions.' 7 In Toucey, the Supreme
Court rejected or severely questioned all but one of the tradi-
tional judicially created exceptions.' 8 One commentator has ar-
gued that by enacting section 2283, Congress intended to
ceeding or the federal stay. See C. WRIGHr, supra note 11, § 52. For example,
federal courts must exercise restraint in deciding constitutional challenges of
state action so as not to intrude improperly on a state's right to act or to en-
force its laws in state courts. See id. §§ 46, 52, 52A. Theoretically, of course, the
application of these abstention principles takes place subsequent to the deter-
nuination that the federal court is not barred from staying state court proceed-
ings either because the anti-injunction statute does not apply or because a
statutory exception is present.
13. The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel also serve to re-
duce the friction resulting from duplication of proceedings in federal and state
courts. See notes 62-71 infra and accompanying text.
14. 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
15. See note 8 supra.
16. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175, 183 (1920).
17. For a discussion of these exceptions, see Toucey v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 314 U.S. 118, 132-39 (1941); J. MOORE, MOORE'S JUDICIAL CODE: COMMEN-
TARY 0.03(49), at 402-06 (1949); note 18 infra.
18. 314 U.S. at 139-41.
The Toucey Court listed the exceptions created by acts of Congress, see id.
at 132-34, as well as the three principal exceptions that had arguably been cre-
ated by judicial action: the res exception, the fraudulently obtained judgment
exception, and the relitigation exception. Id. at 134-37. Courts applying the res
exception have held that in actions in rem, the court, whether federal or state,
that first takes control over the res withdraws it from the reach of all other
courts.
The rank and authority of the [federal and state] courts are equal but
both courts cannot possess or control the same thing at the same time,
and any attempt to do so would result in unseemly conflict. The rule,
therefore, that the court first acquiring jurisdiction shall proceed with-
out interference from a court of the other jurisdiction is a rule of right
and of law based upon necessity, and where the necessity, actual or po-
tential, does not exist, the rule does not apply. Since that necessity
does exist in actions in rem and does not exist in actions in personam,
involving a question of personal liability only, the rule applies in the
former but does not apply in the latter.
Id. at 135 (quoting Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 235 (1922) (brack-
eted language added in Toucey)). For further discussion of the res exception,
see note 34 infra.
The second exception that had arguably been judicially implied allowed
federal courts to enjoin litigants from enforcing judgments fraudulently ob-
tained in state courts. One rationale offered for this exception was that a "pro-
ceeding" is completed once judgment is secured; therefore, an injunction
against the levy of execution does not stay any judicial proceedings. See
1980]
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reestablish the flexible rule of comity that had prevailed prior
to Toucey.19
Indeed, the Reviser's Note to section 2283 states that the
statute "restores the basic law as generally understood prior to
the Toucey decision."20 The Supreme Court, however, has sub-
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 136 (1941); Simon v. Southern
Ry., 236 U.S. 115, 124 (1915).
The third exception discussed in Toucey permitted federal courts to protect
and effectuate their judgments, whether in personam or in rem, by enjoining
relitigation of the same matter in state court. See J. MOORE, supra note 17,
1 0.03(49), at 410-11. In refusing to recognize this exception, the Toucey Court
characterized it as being based on "[1] oose language and a sporadic, ill-consid-
ered decision." 314 U.S. at 139. In addition to these three exceptions, federal
courts also developed exceptions to aid their jurisdiction, whether original or
removal (exceptions that included the res exception), and to prevent the en-
forcement of unconstitutional statutes. See Mayton, supra note 8, at 348; War-
ren, supra note 8, at 366-77.
Until Toucey, the debate over the scope of the then-existing anti-injunction
statute did not focus on whether the statute imposed an absolute ban, but
rather on how the statute could be given some effect as a rule of comity beyond
the equitable principles that govern a court's general ability to issue injunc-
tions. See Durfee & Sloss, Federal- Injunction Against Proceedings in State
Courts: The Life History of a Statute, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1168-69 (1932).
Compare Looney v. Eastern Tex. R.R., 247 U.S. 214, 221 (1918) (injunction can
be issued to protect and preserve jurisdiction over parties or subject matter un-
til controversy decided in federal court first having jurisdiction) with Kline v.
Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229-31 (1922) (injunction cannot be issued to
protect federal court jurisdiction over a controversy but can be issued to pro-
tect jurisdiction over a res).
19. See J. MOORE, supra note 17, T 0.03(26), at 161-62; id. 0.03(49), at 407,
415.
20. H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.-A181 (1948), reprinted in 28
U.S.C.A. § 2283, Reviser's Note (1978). The Note states:
An exception as to Acts of Congress relating to bankruptcy was
omitted and the general exception substituted to cover all exceptions.
The phrase "in aid of its jurisdiction" was added to conform to sec-
tion 1651 of this title and to make clear the recognized power of the
Federal courts to stay proceedings in State cases removed to the dis-
trict courts.
The exceptions specifically included the words "to protect or effec-
tuate its judgments," for lack of which the Supreme Court held that the
Federal courts are without power to enjoin relitigation of cases and
controversies fully adjudicated by such courts. (See Toucey v. New
York Life Insurance Co., [314 U.S. 118 (1941)]. A vigorous dissenting
opinion [314 U.S. at 141] notes that at the time of the 1911 revision of
the Judicial Code, the power of the courts of the United States to pro-
tect their judgments was unquestioned and that the revisers of that
code noted no change and Congress intended no change).
Therefore the revised section restores the basic law as generally
understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision.
The Reviser's Note is unclear as to whether the statute is intended to in-
clude all exceptions or simply to provide examples of some exceptions. Other
legislative history, since sparse, does not clarify this issue. Regardless of the
interpretation given to the Reviser's Note, the scope and intended application
of section 2283 remain vague. See Mayton, supra note 8, at 350; Comment, Anti-
Suit Injunctions Between State and Federal Courts, 32 U. Cm. L. REV. 471, 482
[Vol. 64.830
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sequently declared that section 2283 "is not a statute conveying
a broad general policy for appropriate ad hoc application. Leg-
islative policy is here expressed in a clear-cut prohibition quali-
fied only by specifically defined exceptions." 21 As recently as
1977, the Court unequivocally reaffirmed its rejection of the no-
tion that section 2283 was intended to reinstate a flexible rule of
comity.22
It is now well settled that the anti-injunction statute does
not preclude federal courts from enjoining the institution of
state court proceedings; rather, it applies only when federal
courts attempt to stay state court proceedings that have al-
ready been commenced.23 This general rule, however, provides
inadequate guidance in cases in which a party to a federal ac-
tion moves the court to enjoin the institution of state court pro-
ceedings and the adverse party subsequently files an action in
state court before the federal court concludes its deliberation
over whether to grant the injunction. If issued in such a case,
the injunction would operate to stay a pending state court pro-
ceeding-seemingly a violation of section 2283-even though
the motion was initially made for the permissible objective of
enjoining the institution of state court proceedings. The prob-
lem in such cases is whether the pendency of state court pro-
(1965). Commentary contemporaneous with the passage of the statute empha-
sized the comity principle and the return of "flexibility," see J. MOORE, supra
note 17, T 0.03(49), at 407, 411, and many lower courts followed this interpreta-
tion, see, e.g., Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283, 287-91 (5th Cir. 1969); Baines v.
City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 593-94 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939
(1965); C. WmGruH, supra note 11, § 47, at 202. See also Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S.
274, 279 (1924) (pre-Toucey principle of comity). Courts eventually began to in-
terpret the statute restrictively, however. See cases cited in note 22 infra. The
Supreme Court's view of the statute seems to depend on which parties are
before it. The statute was a "clear-cut prohibition," in Amalgamated Clothing
Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 516 (1955), a case in which a union
sought an injunction requiring an employer to withdraw an action commenced
in state court. When the United States sought a stay, however, section 2283 was
an "ambiguous statute." Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 226
(1957). No statutory language or comment in the Reviser's Note expressly al-
lowed the exception recognized in Leiter Minerals for suits brought by the
United States.
21. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 515-16
(1955).
22. The Court stated that the anti-injunction statute "is an absolute prohi-
bition against any injunction of any state court proceedings, unless the injunc-
tion falls within one of the three specifically defined exceptions in the
[statute]." Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630 (1977). See Mitch-
urn v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 229 (1972); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1970); Amalgamated Clothing Workers
v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 515-16 (1955).
23. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965). See also Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 166-68 (1908).
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ceedings should be determined as of the time that the federal
court's injunctive power is first invoked or as of the later time
that the injunction is actually issued.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed
this timing issue in Barancik v. Investors Funding Corp.24 In
Barancik, the court affirmed a lower court's decision to stay a
state court proceeding that had been instituted after the fed-
eral court plaintiff moved for an injunction to preserve the sta-
tus quo, but before the motion was granted.25 The section 2283
bar against federal court stays of state court proceedings does
not apply, reasoned Judge Stevens, when federal injunctive
power has been invoked before the state court proceeding is
commenced. 26 If it did apply, a defendant could preempt a fed-
eral court's ability to rule on a motion simply by filing a com-
plaint in state court before the federal court has ruled on the
motion. The Barancik court found it "unseemly" that a litigant
might be able to deprive a federal court of the power to decide
an issue properly before it.27 The court also expressed concern
that conceding this power to litigants would impede rational ju-
dicial decisionmaking,2 8 and would also encourage use of the
type of hurriedly issued ex parte temporary restraining or-
ders29 that the statute was intended to prevent.30 Despite its
holding that the anti-injunction statute did not apply to this sit-
uation, the Barancik court recognized that the propriety of a
federal court stay of state court proceedings is limited "by the
principles of equity, comity, and federalism."3 1
In Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth,32 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit faced the same issue that had previ-
ously been decided in Barancik. Declining to follow Barancik,
the Roth court concluded that, for the purpose of applying the
anti-injunction statute, the pendency of state court proceedings
should be determined as of the time that the injunction is actu-
ally issued, not as of the time that the court's injunctive power
24. 489 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1973).
25. Id. at 938.
26. Id. at 937.
27. Id.
28. See text accompanying note 53 infra.
29. See generally Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wash. 2d
799, 804-06, 567 P.2d 205, 209 (1977).
30. 489 F.2d at 937-38.
31. Id. at 938 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972)). For
brief explanations of these principles, see notes 10-12 supra.




is initially invoked.33 The Roth court held that section 2283 ab-
solutely bars federal courts from issuing an injunction staying
state court proceedings that have already been commenced,
unless one or more of the express statutory exceptions apply.34
The Roth court relied primarily on a literal reading of sec-
tion 2283 which, by its terms, forbids federal courts from grant-
ing "an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court."35 The
33. 583 F.2d at 532-34.
34. Id. at 534. As well as adopting the Barancik rationale that the section
2283 prohibition does not apply when federal injunctive power has been in-
voked before the state court proceedings are commenced, see id. at 530; text ac-
companying notes 24-27 supra, the district court had held that the statutory
exception allowing stays "necessary in aid of [a federal court's] jurisdiction,"
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), provided an alternative ground for staying the state pro-
ceedings. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, rejected this ar-
gument. 583 F.2d at 535. The court reasoned that the district court's earlier stay
of the investors' suit pending disposition of its companion case, see note 3
supra, was never intended to stay the initiation of collection actions in state
court, because the district court in its decree expressly allowed the plaintiffs to
seek injunctive relief from the Bank's intended suits if necessary. See 583 F.2d
at 535 & n.3. Moreover, the Roth court found that a concurrent in personam suit
in a state court does not necessarily interfere with a federal court's jurisdiction,
as the narrowly interpreted "in aid of jurisdiction" exception requires. See id.
at 535; J. MOORE, supra note 17, 0.03(49), at 403-06. Courts commonly interpret
the "necessary in aid of jurisdiction" language as embodying the res exception,
see Mayton, supra note 8, at 357-69, which was judicially created prior to the
enactment of the current anti-injunction statute. The res exception, first
adopted in Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 231 (1922), allows federal
courts to stay proceedings in rem but not proceedings in personam. See note
18 supra. The Kline rule has been criticized, see Mayton, supra note 8, at 359;
Redish, The Anti-Injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. Cm. L REv. 717, 749
(1977); Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference with State
Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion,
53 N.C. L. REV. 591, 594 n.11 (1975), and neither the Reviser's Note, see note 20
supra, nor the statute's language supports the Kline distinction. In addition,
the authority quoted by the Kline Court, when read in full, supports the ab-
sence, rather than the presence, of the distinction. See Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
Wabash R.R., 119 F. 678, 679 (7th Cir. 1902). Moreover, the distinction between
in rem and in personam jurisdiction in other contexts is disappearing. See
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See also Mayton, supra note 8, at 358.
The Kline rule overemphasizes the term "necessary" in the "in aid of juris-
diction" exception. A court should be able to grant a stay to assist its jurisdic-
tion, not just to preserve it when absolutely necessary. A stay controls the
parties and the controversy, and thus allows a rational resolution of the contro-
versy before the court. See Mayton, supra note 8, at 361-69; Redish, supra, at
748-53. The interest in rational decisionmaking supports the lower court's grant
of a stay in Roth, since decisions in the state court enforcement suits could pre-
cede the federal decision and interfere with the federal proceedings if the doc-
trines of res judicata or collateral estoppel are applicable. See notes 62-71 infra
and accompanying text. A stay in this case, although not absolutely necessary
to preserve jurisdiction, is certainly necessary to assist jurisdiction. The "in aid
of jurisdiction" exception should thus be construed to "reassert the power and
integrity of the federal courts in their relations with [the state courts]." Red-
ish, supra, at 760; see Mayton, supra note 8, at 369-70.
35. See text accompanying note 9 supra. The court in Roth asserted, 'The
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court observed that regardless of when the federal injunctive
power was first invoked, "the fact is that the federal district
court enjoined... state court proceedings which had already
been commenced when the injunction was issued."36 The Ba-
rancik rule, argued the court, runs afoul of the plain language
of the anti-injunction statute; it is a judicial improvisation that
prevents state court proceedings which are commenced in fact
from also being commenced in law.3 7
In reaching its decision, the Roth court also considered the
policy argument that courts must be allowed to preserve ex-
isting conditions while deliberating over whether to grant an in-
junction to preserve the status quo. The court did not believe,
however, that this policy called for a solution like that applied
in Barancik; rather, it believed that the problem could be
solved simply by having courts issue, at the time the motion to
enjoin is made, temporary restraining orders covering only the
deliberation period.38 In the absence of such orders, the Roth
court concluded, state and federal courts would be allowed to
proceed concurrently and relief from error, if any, would be ob-
tained in appellate courts. 3 9 Obviously, the court's view of the
gravity of this policy consideration was tempered by its judg-
ment that the form of inter-court friction most necessary to
avoid is the friction that arises when a federal court interferes
with a state court proceeding already in progress. 40
One major difficulty with the Roth decision is the court's
insistence that its holding was compelled by a literal reading of
the statute. In light of the timing issue, there is more than one
reasonable way to interpret the statutory term "state court pro-
ceeding." For the purposes of section 2283, the term could refer
Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that the [anti-injunction statute's] ban is
absolute and [its] language is to be taken literally." 583 F.2d at 533. The court
quoted extensively from Supreme Court decisions that speak of "absolute pro-
hibition," id. (quoting Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1970)), and the "clear-cut prohibition qualified only
by specifically defined exceptions." 583 F.2d at 533 (quoting Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 516 (1955), quoted in Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970)).
According to the Roth court, the statute literally prohibits federal courts from
enjoining any state court proceedings that have already been commenced. The
court found that the district court had in fact enjoined pending state court pro-
ceedings and that the statute absolutely barred such action. See 583 F.2d at 533.
36. 583 F.2d at 533.
37. Id. at 534.
38. Id. at 532.
39. Id. at 533 (quoting Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomo-
tive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1970)).
40. 583 F.2d at 531-33.
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either to proceedings already pending at the time the motion to
enjoin is made or to those pending when the motion is finally
granted. There is inferential support in the case law for the
proposition that the state court proceedings covered by the
anti-injunction statute are only those commenced before fed-
eral injunctive powers are invoked.41 Since the legislative his-
tory of section 2283 is sparse,42 and its chief source-the
Reviser's Note-is silent on the matter,4 3 the Roth court's re-
sort to literalism raises the fundamental question of whether
the statute was even intended to apply in this type of fact situa-
tion.44
41. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965); McSurely v. Rat-
liff, 282 F. Supp. 848, 853 (E.D. Ky. 1967); cf. Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 401, 403
(1935) (interpreting previous statute). The time that a court's power is invoked
is used as a temporal reference point, which is necessary for deciding issues
such as whether diverse domicile exists, see, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S.
397, 405 n.6 (1970); Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n.1 (1957); Dery v. Wyer, 265
F.2d 804, 808 (2d Cir. 1952); Boesenberg v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 128 F.2d
245, 247 (7th Cir. 1942), whether an amount-in-controversy requirement is met,
see, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405 n.6 (1970); Commercial Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Fowles, 154 F.2d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 1946), and whether federal removal ju-
risdiction exists, see, e.g., Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303
U.S. 283, 291-94 (1938). Generally, the actions of a party taken after jurisdiction
has vested in a court cannot deprive the court of its jurisdiction. Moreover,
when a litigant performs an act during the time a court is considering whether
to enjoin the act, some courts have found the litigant to be in contempt and
have allowed restoration of the subject of the decision. See Griffin v. County
School, 363 F.2d 206, 211-12 (4th Cir. 1966); 52 VA. L REv. 1556, 1568 (1966). See
also Jones v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 298 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1976); National For-
est Preservation Group v. Butz, 485 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1973).
The Dombrowski case concerned abstention, for which a timing issue
arises twice. Before a court decides whether to abstain from acting, it first
must determine that it has power to act. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 484 n.2 (1965). The anti-injunction statute governs this determination, and
the timing issue raised in Barancik and Roth is crucial. See text accompanying
notes 45-49 infra. If the power to stay exists, then the federal court must still
consider how the timing of the suits and motions influences the propriety of ab-
stention. See Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259, 264 n.8
(1977) (federal court abstention unnecessary if federal complaint was filed
"well before" state court proceedings); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349-50
(1975) (federal court should abstain if state prosecution precedes substantial
federal proceedings on merits); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49-53 (1971) (it is
seldom proper to stay a state criminal prosecution, even though there is a con-
stitutional defense, if prosecution preceded federal suit). See generally 17 C.
WmiGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDIC-
TION § 4252 (1978 & Supp. 1979); Ziegler, An Accommodation of the Younger
Doctrine and the Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safe-
guards in the State Criminal Process, 125 U. PA. L REV. 266, 285-87 (1976).
42. See Redish, supra note 34, at 735 n.84.
43. See note 20 supra.
44. If the application of any section of the anti-injunction statute were to
be confined to a literal interpretation, logically it should be the exception for
stays "expressly authorized by Congress." But cf. Amalgamated Clothing
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The Roth court criticized the approach taken by the court
in Barancik as nonliteral and implied that the Barancik inter-
pretation was incorrect because it resulted in the application of
the anti-injunction statute as if it established a flexible rule of
comity.4 5 This reasoning, however, emphasizes the Roth
court's failure to appreciate the significance of the timing issue
and the distinction between the power to stay proceedings and
the propriety of staying proceedings. The Barancik court did
not interpret the statute as if it created a flexible rule of comity;
on the contrary, the express holding of Barancik was that sec-
tion 2283 did not even apply to the situation before it.46 The
court, therefore, had the power to enjoin state court proceed-
ings.47 Since the Barancik court was not applying the anti-
injunction statute, it can hardly be said that the court applied it
as a flexible rule of comity.
In fact, the Barancik court considered the propriety of the
challenged injunction with respect to the principles of equity,
comity, and federalism that limit a federal court's power to en-
join proceedings in a state court in situations not controlled by
the anti-injunction statute.48 The Roth court was "unable to
understand the logic of Barancik which seems to say that even
though the statute is mandatory, the fact of the pendency of
state court proceedings is not binding, although it is an impor-
tant factor in the court's determination of whether to exercise
Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1955) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)
(protesting literalism in this context). Literalism, however, does not limit the
interpretation of even this exception. In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972),
the Court created a test that invited "wide-ranging judicial inquiry into extra-
statutory matters," Redish, supra note 34, at 735 n.84, such as legislative his-
tory, to determine "whether an Act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right
or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity, could be given its intended
scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding." 407 U.S. at 238. This test
allows not only the express exceptions to which the statute literally refers, but
also implied exceptions. See Redish, supra note 34, at 736.
A second example of the departure of courts from a literal interpretation of
section 2283 is the judicially created exception for stays sought by the United
States. The language of the anti-injunction statute does not exclude the United
States from its compass. The Supreme Court has held, however, that the stat-
ute is inapplicable to such stays because a denial would frustrate superior fed-
eral interests and thus could not be within the congressional intent. See Leiter
Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 225-36 (1957).
45. See Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d at 532-34.
46. Barancik v. Investors Funding Corp., 489 F.2d at 937.
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976).
48. "Our holding that the statutory bar is inapplicable does not, of course,
mean that the federal court should or may ignore 'the principles of equity, com-
ity and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a
state court proceeding."' 489 F.2d at 938 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 243 (1972)). See notes 10-12 supra.
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its equitable powers."49 Had the Roth court grasped the full
import of the timing issue and the power-propriety distinction,
it would undoubtedly have realized that the mandatory lan-
guage of section 2283 was irrelevant to the Barancik court since
the holding in that case was not based on an application of the
statute. Rather, the Barancik court was exercising its equita-
ble powers because it found that the situation before it was not
covered by the anti-injunction statute; the injunction of state
court proceedings is obviously concomitant to a federal court's
exercise of its equitable powers.5 0
The conflict between the Roth and Barancik courts, then, is
not over the issue of whether the anti-injunction statute should
be interpreted literally or as a flexible rule of comity. The real
dispute concerns at what point in the motion-making process
the federal court should determine whether there are any state
court proceedings pending. The question is thus whether sec-
tion 2283 will limit the federal court's power to issue an injunc-
tion to preserve the status quo. Since the answer to this
question is not evident from either the language or the legisla-
tive history of section 2283, the balance of this Comment will
examine the broader question of the relationship between state
and federal courts. This analysis suggests that the Barancik
rule is clearly preferable to the rule announced in Roth.
Three basic policies underlying the relationship between
state and federal courts also affect the section 2283 timing is-
sue: first, avoiding needless inter-court friction; second, effi-
ciently utilizing the expertise of each forum; and third,
minimizing unnecessary duplication of proceedings in state
and federal courts.
The policy of avoiding needless friction between federal
and state courts is central to the discussions of the status quo
problem in both Roth and Barancik. Both courts relied on
United States v. United Mine Workers5 ' for the proposition that
a federal court may preserve existing conditions while it delib-
erates over its power and over the propriety of issuing an in-
junction to preserve the status quo. In United Mine Workers,
the defendant union threatened to terminate unilaterally its la-
bor agreement with the United States government, which was
at that time operating the nation's coal mines. The government
sought a declaratory judgment confirming that the union had
49. 583 F.2d at 534.
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976).
51. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
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no right to terminate the agreement, and obtained an ex parte
temporary restraining order forbidding the union from striking
until the federal court could determine whether it had jurisdic-
tion over the matter. Despite the order, the union went on
strike, and the lower court found the union guilty of civil and
criminal contempt. Affirming and modifying the lower court or-
der, the Supreme Court declared that regardless of whether the
court had jurisdiction to restrain the union from striking, the
court did have the power to preserve the status quo pending its
decision on the jurisdictional question.52
From United Mine Workers, the Barancik court took the
principle that once a party invokes a federal court's power to
enjoin some act, the adverse party may not preempt the issue
simply by performing the act before the court can conclude its
deliberation:
During its process of deliberation, the court, not the defendant, should
have the ultimate power to determine the scope of its authority. It may
be argued that the [anti-injunction] statute requires the federal court
to protect its authority by promptly issuing a temporary restraining or-
der. But such a construction might encourage the liberal granting of
the kind of protective orders the statute was intended to prevent.
Moreover, it might require the court to take action without notice to
the opposing party lest the court's power be defeated before it can rule
with deliberation.53
The Roth court narrowly limited this principle and concluded
that a federal court would not be able to issue any injunctive
relief more disruptive than a temporary restraining order cov-
ering the deliberation period.54 Thus, the rule followed in Roth
would force a federal court to restrain temporarily the institu-
tion of state proceedings every time a motion for an injunction
to preserve the status quo is made, if the court wanted to retain
its power to decide the motion. Under the Barancik rule, how-
ever, courts would issue stays, if necessary, at later dates
rather than restrain every conceivable state court proceeding in
advance.
Since one purpose of the anti-injunction statute is to pre-
vent "needless friction" 55 between federal and state courts, it is
in this light that the Roth rule concerning injunctions to pre-
52. See id. at 262-69, 289-95.
53. 489 F.2d at 937-38 (footnote omitted).
54. See 583 F.2d at 532.
55. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9
(1940). The Supreme Court has characterized the friction resulting from a fed-
eral court stay of state court proceedings as "inevitable." Vendo Co. v. Lektro-




serve the status quo should be examined. Inter-court friction
might result whenever a federal court stays state court pro-
ceedings; the federal court may be seen as questioning the
state court's ability to decide certain issues. Needless friction
might also result, however, from the failure of a federal court to
stay certain state court proceedings.5 6 A state court may wel-
come a federal stay if it relieves the court of a duty to adjudi-
cate some difficult issues of federal law, 57 such as the federal
securities law issue presented in Roth. In Roth, a federal court
decision on the issue would either preclude the Bank's actions
in state courts or would allow the Bank to enforce the promis-
sory notes expeditiously. Thus, the repeated issuance of tem-
porary restraining orders, which would result from the
application of Roth, would probably cause more needless inter-
court friction than the selective issuing of stays urged by the
court in Barancik. The reasoning of Barancik makes it clear
that a federal court should issue such stays only when the fed-
eral court's power is invoked in a timely manner and only if the
stay is calculated to reduce needless friction.
The second policy consideration underlying the relation-
56. Voluntary stays by state courts in their own proceedings would not ad-
equately solve this problem. When there are multiple state court proceedings,
the danger exists that not all the state courts will stay their proceedings; thus,
the objective of judicial economy would not be achieved. A federal stay would
provide the uniformity necessary to prevent friction which might arise between
state courts that voluntarily stay proceedings and those that do not. The fed-
eral stay of state court proceedings also forces the state court plaintiff to direct
its attention to the federal proceedings rather than to collateral state proceed-
ings. The federal stay is thus especially appropriate when the federal proceed-
ing addresses a question the answer to which expedites states proceedings or
requires federal court expertise. See text accompanying notes 58-59 infra.
The federal stay also resolves most efficiently the issue of whether state
courts should stay their own actions, because a federal stay precludes the ne-
cessity to move for state court stays. The possibility that a state court may de-
fer to federal proceedings does not argue against the exercise by federal courts
of the power to control disputes before them. Moreover, allowing federal courts
to stay state proceedings instituted after the motion to stay diminishes the
problem of state court plaintiffs (federal defendants) seeking to escape an un-
favorable federal forum, and protects the federal court plaintiffs' original choice
of the federal forum. This is especially important in cases such as Roth, in
which the issues are within exclusive federal jurisdiction.
The goal of the federal court in Roth was the careful protection of its juris-
diction. The investors made several motions for temporary restraining orders
and preliminary injunctions staying state proceedings in order to conduct the
discovery necessary for arguing the stay motion. The district court consistently
granted the minimum relief necessary for the investors to proceed. See note 3
supra. The lower court in Roth obviously viewed reasoned argument and
prompt but unrushed deliberation as methods of limiting needless friction with
the state courts.
57. See Mayton, supra note 8, at 353-54.
1980]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ship between state and federal courts involves the procedural
advantages of proceeding in a federal court and the expertise of
that court. These considerations also support an interpretation
of section 2283 in accord with the Barancik rule, because that
rule allows a federal court to preserve its jurisdiction and util-
ize its expertise when necessary. For example, there are strong
reasons for allowing a federal court to stay state court proceed-
ings instituted after a motion for injunctive relief when the fed-
eral suit involves an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction, as
did the investors' class action in Roth.58 Congress provided
such jurisdiction to "ensure the vindication of federal laws" by
promoting uniform application and interpretation, to utilize the
expertise of the federal courts in interpreting complex federal
legislation, and to provide the advantages of federal procedure,
especially in comprehensive discovery and in rules of evi-
dence.59 State courts are permitted neither to exercise jurisdic-
tion over claims arising under federal laws that grant exclusive
jurisdiction to federal courts nor to grant affirmative relief on
counterclaims within exclusive federal jurisdiction.60 There is
a danger that state court judgments may be either incomplete
or inconsistent with federal court judgments when they include
issues committed to exclusive federal jurisdiction.6 1
The third policy consideration involves the problem of du-
plicative state and federal proceedings. The inadequacy of the
res judicata and collateral estoppel doctrines as factors limiting
58. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
59. See Note, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Prior State Court Findings
in Cases Within Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1281-82
(1978).
60. Although some state courts have ruled that they are even barred from
considering defenses arising under exclusive federal jurisdiction, the
supremacy clause requires a state court to enforce all federal law claims over
which it has jurisdiction, and thus state courts must consider as a defense, but
not as a counterclaim, a claim arising within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts. See id. at 1285-86, 1303.
61. A state compulsory-counterclaim rule, parallel to FED. R. Crv. P. 13(a),
could also cause problems because a party would lose a federal claim if it is not
asserted as a defense in state court. Yet, if the claim is asserted, issues of fact
resolved by a state court might be precluded from federal determination. See
text accompanying notes 65-69 infra. If the preclusive effect were not recog-
nized in federal court, the state court defendant would have two chances to
prove the same facts. See Note, supra note 59, at 1293. If a subsequent federal
judgment was contrary to a state judgment, the federal court conceivably
would have to include the amount of the erroneous state judgment in its dam-
age award. In Roth, if the investors prevail, the federal court would have to
award them damages for all the erroneous deficiency judgments they suffered
in various state courts. This result, which in effect would void nearly seventy




such duplication favors the Barancik rule. Although ries judi-
cata--claim preclusion-serves to eliminate a threat of dupli-
cate proceedings, 62 a litigant must obtain final judgment before
pleading res judicata as a defense to a subsequent action.
Thus, the doctrine provides no relief from concurrent suits. 63
Moreover, res judicata is different from injunctive relief be-
cause a litigant must appear and plead res judicata in every
court in which the opponent brings suit. The prospect in Roth
of appearing and pleading res judicata in seventy separate suits
illustrates the inadequacy of the relief provided by the doc-
trine. The court entertaining the motion for an injunction, how-
ever, has already been fully informed of the nature of the
controversy and has the litigants appearing before it.
Suits proceeding concurrently in federal and state court
also raise the possibility of conflicting judgments. An adverse
judgment in state court must be appealed through the state ap-
pellate system rather than be attacked collaterally in a federal
court entertaining a duplicate proceeding.6 4 In Roth, the pros-
pect of seventy state court suits, subsequent appeals, and the
almost inevitable inconsistencies and conflicts among the state
and federal decisions illustrates the inefficiency of allowing
state proceedings to proceed before questions of federal law
have been resolved.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel-issue preclusion-also
limits duplicative adjudications by precluding relitigation of is-
sues already litigated by the parties or their privies, assuming
that a full and fair opportunity to litigate existed.6 5 Generally,
state court determinations of fact, of state law, or of federal law
within areas of concurrent jurisdiction receive preclusive effect
in federal courts. 66 State court determinations of federal law or
62. The doctrine of res judicata is intended to prevent courts from deciding
a controversy between the same parties that has already been finally decided
in another court. See Comment, supra note 20, at 474 n.17.
63. See 1B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405[1], at 624 (3d ed. 1974).
64. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 107, at 537.
65. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-28 (1979); Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328-29
(1971). Collateral estoppel operates to conclude litigation, to prevent the har-
assment of parties, and to promote efficient use of a court's resources. The doc-
trine is more flexible than res judicata, which requires the same parties and the
same cause of action or claim. Collateral estoppel requires actual prior litiga-
tion of an issue, whereas res judicata can bar a claim or defense that should
have been asserted in the prior suit but was not.
66. See Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 188-89 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976); Note, Res Judicata: Ex-
clusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior State-Court Determination,
53 VA. L. REV. 1360, 1363-65 (1967).
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of both fact and federal law, however, are not afforded similar
treatment if the law is within the exclusive jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts. 67 When determining whether to preclude litigation
in such cases, courts must weigh several factors: the parties'
interests in economical litigation and freedom from vexatious
litigation, their interests in having a full opportunity to discover
and present evidence in a forum of their choice, and the federal
government's interest in the uniform application of its laws by
judges possessing the requisite expertise.68 There are, how-
ever, problems that arise in balancing these interests. 69
There are a number of possible solutions to the problem of
duplicative litigation. These solutions include the careful redef-
inition of the application and effect of preclusion doctrine, state
court stays of their own proceedings, 70 and legislation permit-
ting removal of defenses arising within areas of exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction.71 "[T]he best equitable remedy [is] a stay of
state proceedings" 72 because only a stay can adequately accom-
modate the interests of economy, efficiency, and freedom from
harassing litigation. Stays eliminate duplicative adjudication
67. In resolving the collection actions on the promissory notes at issue in
Roth, the state courts may be required to decide matters of federal securities
law committed to exclusive federal jurisdiction. See note 2 supra. The problem
of the preclusive effect that the findings of law from multiple state proceedings
may have on subsequent federal proceedings has not received much attention
in the case law. See generally Note, supra note 59; Note, The Effect of Prior
Nonfederal Proceedings on Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction Over Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936 (1971); Note, supra
note 66. For example, if cases are proceeding concurrently in two or more state
courts, it is not clear which state court's findings should preclude the issue in
federal court, nor is it clear whether the first state court finding should have a
preclusive effect in all subsequent cases. It is also unclear whether a state
court finding against a person who later becomes a class representative binds
all other class members in federal court. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 1976). See also Ballas v. Symm, 351 F.
Supp. 876, 882 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
68. See Note, supra note 66, at 1365.
69. First, the legal theory advanced will define the range of facts received
by the court, and different courts have different rules governing discovery and
proof of facts. Second, and more importantly, the fullness and fairness of the
opportunity to litigate depends partially on the parties' realization of the possi-
ble preclusive effect of the action. Full litigative resources might not be used if
the claim is considered inconsequential at the time of its litigation. Finally, the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel give insufficient weight to a
court's interest in ensuring the integrity of legal findings based on its own juris-
diction's substantive law, when these findings have been made by courts of
other jurisdictions. See Note, supra note 59, at 1285.
70. See note 56 supra.
71. For a discussion of the removal solution as the "optimal" one, see Note,
supra note 59, at 1305-08.
72. Id. at 1301.
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by allowing the state court proceedings to continue, if neces-
sary, after resolution of the federal issue, and by thus resolving
most questions of preclusion, inconsistent judgments, and dam-
ages. Stays might be dangerous if used to delay the decision on
an issue upon which the state court defendant cannot bring a
federal complaint, or if used to gain a change of forum when a
state court outcome is likely to be unfavorable.7 3 These dan-
gers, however, have little to do with determining the narrow is-
sue of the timing of the anti-injunction statute's applicability.
They either are more adequately and appropriately handled by
the exercise of the discretionary equitable powers of federal
courts,7 4 or by the enactment of legislation that indirectly
reaches the same result as Barancik.7 5 Thus, a federal court
stay of state court proceedings commenced after the motion for
the stay provides an effective and relatively nondisruptive rem-
edy for some problems engendered by complex litigation.
Federal court stays of state court proceedings commenced
after the motion for the stay has been made should be permit-
ted. The language of the anti-injunction statute does not "liter-
ally" dictate this rule, but neither does it forbid it. Moreover,
sound policy considerations, including the functioning of the
statute within the general framework of federal procedures,
support this conclusion. The Roth court's interpretation of sec-
tion 2283 is inadequate and should not prevail.
73. An example would be a declaratory judgment of patent infringement.
Id. at 1304-05.
74. See text accompanying notes 48-49 supra.
75. For example, a new federal defense removal statute, although perhaps
desirable, would provide an indirect means of obtaining a federal stay within
the accepted interpretation of the exception to the anti-injunction statute for
stays necessary in aid of jurisdiction. See note 20 supra.
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